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LIABILITY OF BANK AFTER PAYING CHECK FRAUDULENTLY RAISED BY
FILLING SPACES LEFT IN DRAWING
The drawer issues a check in which are spaces before and after
the words and figures indicating the amount. The spaces are filled
by another without authority from the drawer, and the amount is
thus raised without giving the check an appearance to excite suspicion.
Can the drawee bank, which in good faith pays the raised check,
charge the entire amount against the drawer?
Ninety years ago Young v. Grote" answered this question in the
affirmative. A case recently decided by the English Court of Appeal
reaches the opposite conclusion, affirming the judgment of the lower
court which found that the drawer was not guilty of any negligence
which misled the bank, and if he was guilty of negligence, the
(187 Eng. C. P.) 4 Bing. 253. Accord, Timbel v. Garfield Nat'l Bank (i9o7,
N. Y.) i2 App. Div. 87o; xo6 N. Y. Supp. 497. See also 8 C. J. 734 for conflict
as to application of Young v. Grote to actions by innocent purchasers against
acceptors, makers and endorsers.
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negligence did not cause the loss. Macmillan v. London Joint Stock
Bank (C. A.) [1917] 2 K. B. 433.
The bank and the drawer stand in the relation of debtor and creditor.
The bank by the contract acquires the power of discharging its debt
by paying genuine orders, and is also under a duty to honor genuine
orders or answer in damages. The depositor has entirely within his
control the creation of an existing state of facts which will compel the
performance of the bank's duty to him and enable the bank to exercise
its power of discharging its debt to him. In the instant case the bank
has attempted to exercise its power in reliance on an appearance
of the existence of those facts, which appearance has resulted from
a third party's criminally taking advantage of the drawer's failure
to observe the ordinary business methods intended to prevent such
crimes. It is legally possible to place the responsibility for the
resulting loss on the depositor in several ways. We may say the
bank under the circumstances acquired no power so to discharge its
debt, but can hold the depositor in tort for damages for the difference
between the genuine and raised check; or, to avoid circuity of action,
allow the bank to use its right of action as a set-off in the action by the
depositor against it. But the most direct way of placing responsibility
on the diawer is to say that the bank under the circumstances has the
power to discharge its debt by honoring the raised order. If we adopt
this conclusion we, in effect say that a change in the legal relations of
bank and depositor has resulted from the wrongful act of the holder in
filling in the spaces. It is clear that the holder had no right to collect
the check when raised for the drawer was not under any duty to him
after the check had been altered; nor had he the privilege of collecting,
for he was under a duty to the drawer not to collect more than the
amount of the original check. Then responsibility for the results
must be placed on the depositor because, in view of his acts, a power
is given the holder by law to subject the depositor to the liability of
being divested of his legal rights under his contract with the bank.
Professor Hohfeld has thus described legal powers: "A change in a
given legal relation may result from . . . some superadded fact or
group of facts which are under the control of one or more human
beings," in which case, "the person whose volitional control is
paramount may be said to have the (legal) power to effect the par-
ticular change of legal relations that is involved in the problem." 2
Again, "legal powers and correlative liabilities involving the divesting
of legal and equitable rights in rem (and other jural relations belong-
ing to the particular aggregates involved) have existed from the
earliest times. Such powers are-created by the law on various grounds
'Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (i913) 23 YAL.
LAw JouRNr. i6, 44.
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of policy and convenience." s The problem then is simply one of the
naked legal power of the wrongdoer and the correlative liability of
the drawer.
An examination of the powers thus described shows, first, that the
exercise of the power divests legal rights and does not merely give
rise to liability ex delicto. P through A as agent loans money to T
and leaves T's note and mortgage in A's possession but gives A no
authority to collect. Payments made by T on account discharge the
debt pro tanto.4 Again the maker of a bearer note who pays it at
maturity in good faith to the thief in possession has discharged his
debt to the true owner.5 Second, the law does not create the power
.because of negligence on the part of the person whose legal relations
are changed by its exercise. The power of the thief to give an inde-
feasible right to the purchaser in good faith of negotiable bonds
payable to bearer stolen from the owner's safe is not created by law
because of the owner's negligence in the manner in which.he kept
the bonds, but simply in view of the fact that he failed to retain them
in his possession.6 The liability of a partner on new contracts made
by his associates after dissolution is not because of his negligence in
failing to give notice, for it is immaterial that sufficient time has
not elapsed in which to give notice,7 or that reasonable efforts
have been made to give. notice." There is of course no agency in
fact, but a power given by the law on grounds of business policy.
Third, the act oi' omission of the person against whom the power is
exercised need not be the "proximate cause." It is sufficient if it is
in the chain of causation and the circumstances are such that sound
policy and business convenience require that the power be given.
In each of the above illustrations there is the intervention of the
independent wrongful acts of the- one exercising the power, and in
some instances the acts are criminal. To say that the drawer is not
responsible because he is not guilty of negligence, and that even if he
is negligent, the crime, not the negligence, is the "proximate cause,"
is to leave unanswered the question, whether the law should not, in
situations like the one under consideration, as a matter of business
convenience and in the interest of fair dealing, give the holder the
power, by certain acts, to confer upon the bank the power of discharg-
ing its debt to the drawer by honoring the raised instrument.
Fusindamental Legal Conceptions (1917) 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL 710, 756. See
also Prof. Walter W. Cook, Powers of Court of Equity (1915) i COLUMBIA L.
REv. 228, 251.
'Crane v. Gruenewald (i89o) 12o N. Y. 274,24 N. E. 456.
'Greve v. Schweitzer (1875) 36 Wis. 554. N. I. L. secs. 88, 11g.
'Professor Underhill Moore, Theft of Incomplete Negotiable Instrument and
Negotiation to a Holder in Due Course (1917) 17 COLUMBIA L. Rzv. 617.
'Bristol v. Sprague (1832, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Wend. 423.
"Austin v. Holland (1877) 69 N. Y. 571.
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The problem being one of business convenience and policy, its
solution must depend largely on the actual method by which the
bank of necessity conducts its checking business, the business world's
conduct and understanding in the premises, and the economic policy
of both law and business of encouraging as far as possible the use of
this species of credit as a substitute'for money in the transaction of
business.
The bank is not in the position of the ordinary debtor. The latter
may refuse to pay an agent at all or postpone payment until direct
inquiry has been made of his principal as to the agent's authority.
In either event he has not increased his legal liability, and, as the
transaction is more or less isolated, the business world does not suffer.
On the other hand the bank must act immediately and act only on
the appearance of the check itself. The bank cannot refuse to honor
genuine checks if there are funds of the depositor's on hand, without
subjecting itself to an action for damages for injury to his credit.
It cannot inquire of each of its thousands of depositors as to the
validity of each check. Not only would ,this be impracticable, but
the delay would be intolerable to the business world and would end
the usefulness of checks as a quick means of transferring credits.9
That the business world appreciates the bank's situation and the
necessity of guarding against check raising is dear from the almcst
universal practice of drawing lines in spaces, if any, before and after
the words and figures fixing the amount the check calls for, and from
the now common use of cutting and stamping devices to indicate the
amount. Business men know that erasures by chemicals or other
means leave tell-tale marks in the check and that when a check is so
drawn that it can be raised without making erasures, by merely filling
spaces, the bank is deprived by the carelessness of the drawer of its
most important means of 'detecting an alteration. It is probably true
that these precautions are due mostly to an understanding among
business men that the responsibility for losses resulting from loosely
drawn checks falls on the drawer, an understanding which accords with
the opinions of most of the leading text writers. To place the respon-
sibility on the drawer would seem to mean simply bringing the law
into accord with the business world's conduct and understanding of
what the situation demands.10  J. W. E.
'Glennon v. Rochester Trust, etc., Co. (1913) 2o9 N. Y. 12, 1o2 N. E. 537,
holding that the administrator of a depositor could not recover from the bank
the amount of a check drawn by the intestate but paid after his death, of which
the bank was ignorant In effect, the court, on grounds of business policy, gives
the holder of the check a power which will divest the legal rights of the adminis-
trator. Leighton v. Bank (1917, Mass.) 1I6 N. E. 414 (insane drawer); Riley
v. Albany Savings Bank (1885, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 36 Hun 513.
"Commercial Bank v. Arden (i9q, Ky.) 197 S. W. 951, reported since the
above was written, holds that the drawer, under facts like those of the principal
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WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE QUESTION OF PURCHASE FOR VALUE OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin raises
the question whether the law of the state governing the contract of
the maker of negotiable paper, or the law of the state where such
paper is acquired, determines what constitutes a purchaser for value.
Suit was brought in Wisconsin to foreclose mortgage bonds issued
by-a Wisconsin corporation in that state. The bonds were void in the
hands of the original holders for fraud and want of consideration,
but were valid in the hands of bona fide holders in due course. A
accepted some of the bonds in New Mexico from B as collateral
security for an antecedent debt. Under the law of Wisconsin such a
transfer would not constitute a transfer for value.' A offered evi-
dence to show that he was a holder for value under the law of New
Mexico, but the evidence was excluded, the court holding that Wis-
consin law governed. Badger Machinery Co. v. Columbia, etc., Lt. &
Power Co. (I9I 7 , Wis.) 163 N. W. I88.
Several views have been expressed with regard to the above question.
According to one view, the matter being one of general commercial
law, the law of the forum should govern 2 In the federal courts it
is the settled rile that in matters of general commercial law, or of
general instead of local law, the federal doctrine will be applied and
not the rule obtaining in any particular state.8 This doctrine was
established by the Supreme Court of the United States, no doubt, for
the purpose of creating, so far as it lay within its power, a uniform
body of law relating to commercial transactions. Some of the state
courts have assumed to exercise the same prerogative of following
their own law in the above class of cases, although they are not in a
position to allege a similar justification or excuse.' If the law of -a
case, is not responsible, as Sec. 124, N. I. L., avoids an altered instrument except
as against a party who has made, authorized or assented to the alteration. While
this provision may fix the liability of the depositor as a party to a negotiable
instrument to subsequent purchasers of the instrument, it is submitted that the
section does not determine his liability arising out of the special relation of bank
and depositor.
'Wis. Stat. 1898 Supp. sec. 1675-51.
' Professor Ames would apply the law of the forum because, in his opinion,
the *question is one of commercial law and not one of jurisdiction. 2 Ames,
Cases on Bills and Notes, 8o6.
'Swift v. Tyson (1842, U. S.) 36 Pet. i, io L. Ed. 865; Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co. v. Baugh (1893) 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct 914, 37 L. Ed. 772.
'Franklin v. Twogood (1868) 25 Iowa, 520; St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat.
Bank (i8gi) i28 N. Y. 26, 27 N. E. 849; Roads v. Webb (1898) 91 Me. 4o6,
4o At. 128; Alabama Mid. Ry. Co. v. Guilford (1903) 3i9 Ga. 523, 46 S. E. 655.
The great majority of states hold to the contrary. See, for example: Sykes
v. Citizens National Bank (19o8) 78 Kans. 688, 98 Pac. 2o6; Forepaugh v.
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (I889) x28 Pa. St 217; 18 Adt. 503; Limerick Nat.
Bank v. Howard (i9o) 7 N. H. 13, 51 At. 641.
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particular state is applicable under the rules of the Conflict of Laws
of the forum, there is no good reason why these rules should be set
aside when the matter in question is one of common law or of general
commercial law. The rules of the Conflict of Laws are based upon
considerations of justice, and if in consequence.of such considerations
the law of a foreign state is to control, it goes without saying that
the nature of the subject matter involved, whether it be of statutory
origin, or one of common law, or of general commercial law, should
be of no consequence.
Another view is to the effect that the law of the state where a
negotiable instrument is acquired by the holder should control the
question of "value."5  This law governs, of course, the rights of
the holder against the party transferring, or negotiating the instrument
to him. But why should it control as regards remote parties, be
they indorsers, acceptors, or makers of promissory notes or negotiable
bonds? Should mnot the nature of their contracts and the extent of
the obligations assumed by them remain fixed, unaffected by the fact
that the instrument may circulate in states or countries where a dif-
ferent law may prevail?
The third view answers the question just stated in the affirmative.
This view is clearly correct, both on theory and from the standpoint
of expediency. The principle of certainty which underlies the whole
subject of bills and notes demands that the liability of each party
be fixed by one law. Whether the contract of the maker of a promis-
sory note or negotiable bond should be subject, on correct theory, to
the law of the place where such instrument is issued, that is, delivered,
or to the law of the place where it is payable, or even to the law of
the place'where the signature was affixed or where the company had
its seat, need not be determined, as in the instant case all of these
places coincided.7  Where the law of the place of payment differs
from that of the place of issue the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies
the former law8 and in so doing it follows the great weight of authority
in this country.9
The tenor of the maker's contract must naturally be ascertained by
reference to the law governing his contract and cannot vary with
respect to the different holders of the instrument. This law will
'Brook v. Vannest (1895, Ct. App.) 58 N. J. L. 162, 33 Ad 382
' Woodruff v. Hill (x874) ix6 Mass. 310; Houston v. Keith (19ri) ioo Miss.
83, s6 So. 336.
'For a discussion of this problem, see Lorenzen, The Rules of the Conflict of
Laws Applicable to Bills and Notes, i MftNN. L. REv. 239-256.
'Brown v. Gates (79o4) i20 Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 2i, 98 N. W. 2o5; Inter-
national Harvester Company v. McAdam (xgio) 742 Wis. ui4, 124 N. W. 1042.
*Brabston v. Gibson (785o U. S.) 9 How. 263, 73 L, Ed. 137; Mason v. Dousay
(1864) 35 Ill. 424; Hunt v. Standart (i86o) x5 Ind. 33; Berger v. Far.sam
(xgoa) 130 Mich. 487, go N. W. 28.
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determine the nature of the instrument that is executed and the
defenses that may be available to him.1" If the controlling law allows,
the maker to set up a personal defense even against a holder in due
course, such law should be followed in every other jurisdiction,
although the municipal law of the forum and of the place where the
plaintiff acquired the instrument may be to the contrary 1 The ques-
tion of what constitutes a holder for value concerns the extent of the
defendant's obligation. Has the defendant agreed that he will not
avail himself of any personal defense as against a party who may
acquire the instrument as collateral security for an antecedent debt?
In accordance with the above point of view the law governing his
contract in general should furnish the answer to this question, and
this is the rule which is supported by the weight of authority in this
country. It appears to be also the view followed by the principal
case.
The case of Embircos v. The Anglo-Austrian Bank12 is not incon-
sistent with the above conclusion. That case in. its broadest interpre-
tation holds only that a title acquired in a mode recognized by the
law of the place of transfer is binding upon the maker, though such
transfer does not conform to the municipal law of. bills and notes
of the state governing the maker's contract. It is a qualification of
the ordinary principles of the Conflict of Laws applicable to bills and
notes which is based upon the analogy of the law governing chattels.
E. G. L.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF THE OFFICERS OF A NON-COMPLYING FOREIGN
CORPORATION
It is not good to be a non-complying foreign corporation; to be a
part of one is worse. There are statutory fines for the corporation
doing business without obtaining authority in the prescribed fashion.
Many courts hold contracts with such a corporation enforceable against
it, but not in its favor.' Officers and directors are sometimes made
sureties for corporate debts. 2 And a few states, with which Illinois
"Brabston v. Gibson, supra.
Ory v. Winter (1826, La.) 4 Mart. N. S. 277.
(C A.) [I9o5] i K. B. 677, 74 L J. Y. B. 326.1 United Lead Co. v. Reedy Elevator Mfg. Co. (i9o6) 2= Ill. x9, 78 N. E. 567;
Parke, Davis and Co. v. Mullett (1912) 245 Mo. i68, 149 S. W. 461, approved in
the principal case as exemplifying "one of the ordinary principles of law";
25 L. R. A. 56, and cases cited. But see as to estoppel of one who deals with
such a corporation, Second Natl. Bk. v. Hall (1878) 35 Oh. St. 158, 166; and
note i4a infra.
'Slater v. Taylor (i9o9) 241 Ill. io2, 89 N. E. 271. And the agent as well as
the corporation may be subject to a statutory fine. Wis. Stat. i91, chap. 85,
sec. z77ob IL
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has now aligned itself by the decision in Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v.
Shaw (1917) 277 Ill. 524, 115 N. E. 65o,1 add officers' and directors'
direct individual liability for claims arising out of business done in
the state in the corporate name. Nor is this all. There is more than
an intimation of the final step in the development: that the court is
ready under such circumstances to hold stockholders, too, as partners.4
Individual liability has been imposed upon stockholders of a foreign
corporation by statute in Colorado, California, and elsewhere ;5 when
so imposed, it has been recognized by the Federal Supreme Court,
though the state of incorporation expressly provided against individual
liability, and though the stockholder was sued in a third state.8 But
Illinois has no such statute; the court reasoned on common law
principles.
Now partnership liability in the stockholders has not been without
recognition at common law., Sometimes it is imposed because the
court, finding fraud in the act of incorporation, refuses to recognize
the latter as valid at all ;7 sometimes because corporate action before
compliance is held beyond the corporatqrs' power, so that they are
treated as partners, like any body of-individuals doing business without
authority to act as a corporation;s or the stockholders' liability, though
impliedly admitted, may be limited to business of a sort prohibited from
'S. c. below (I916) 2oi II. App. 445. A collection of authorities on this
point can be found in L. R. A. 19,7B, 574.
'The holding is made to follow from Hill v. Beach (I85) 12 N. J. Eq. 31;
Taylor v. Branham (i895) 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. 552, is expressly approved.
I Mil's Ann. Stat. Col 1912, §5oi ; N. D. Rev. Codes 1905 §4698, applied in
Chesley v. Soo Lignite Co. (gog) ig N. D. 18, 121 N. W.-73; Cal. Const. art. xii,
§3; Civ. Code §322, applied in a series of cases ending with Provident Gold
Mining Co. v. Haynes (igi6) 173 Cal. 44, 159 Pac. 155. It is to be noted that the
liability imposed by California is for a share of the corporate debt proportional
to the share of the stock held by the defendant For a discussion of this line of
cases, see Coi imn~s (1916) 26 YAr LAw JouRxAL, 343.
'Thomas v. Matthiessen (914) 232 U. S. 221, 34 Sup. Ct. R. 312: the corpora-
tion had been organized in Arizona to do business in California and elsewhere; a
charter provision exempting stockholders from individual liability was held
nullified pro tanto by another charter provision authorizing business to be done
outside Arizona, hence necessarily in, accordance with the laws of the place of
any outside transaction; the stockholder was successfully sued in the Federal
courts in New York. Cf. Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner (i9o8, C. C.
S. D. Tex.) 163 Fed. 6o5, which refused to apply the Colorado statute to a Texas
corporation, because the stockholders had nowhere assented to be individually
liable.
'Montgomery v. Forbes (1889) x48 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342; Davidson v.
Hobson (1894) 59 Mo. App. 130; Journal Co. v. Nelson (i9o8) 133 Mo. App.
482; 113 S. W. 69o.
* Cunnyngham v. Shelby (igi6) 136 Tenn. 176, i88 S. W. 147, developing from
Morton v. Hart Bros. (i8go) 88 Tenn. 427, 12 S. W. io26, where the foreign
corporation's agent was held.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
transaction without a permit ;9 or to business which cannot in the state
concerned be done by any corporation.' In many of the cases which
hold the stockholders the motive underlying the decision appears to
be the desire to frustrate a palpable attempt by the defendants to slip
by the law. And in the lack of some such special circumstance the cases
lean-and properly'-toward denying direct recovery against stock-
holders, treating the non-complying foreign corporation in this respect
as if it were de facto."' The true principle would seem to be that the
law and the creations of the law of any state should be held good
unreservedly in every other state, where they do no violence to rule
or policy of the forum, or of the state of the transaction '--which are
in these cases almost always the same.
Such is not the reasoning of the principal case:18 there the basic
proposition is extraterritorial non-existence of a corporation. It is not
clear how, on such a base of theory, the court can also build the non-
complying corporation's liability to be sued on within-state transactions.
Against a being which "exists only in contemplation of law," and
that only inside the state of its creation, suits are to be brought-and
are in fact brought-in a court where the being "does not exist at
all I"
This liability of the corporation to be sued as a corporation, how-
ever, fits joint for joint with the true common law principle outlined
above. Disability, where imposed, to sue on a contract made without
"Lescher & Sow Co. '. Moser (1913 Tex. Civ. App.) z59 S. W. xoI8, 1o26.
"Empire Mills v. Aiston Grocery Co. (z89x, Tex. Civ. App.) 4 Willson 346,
15 S. W. 505; and see Mandeville v. Courtright (19o5, C. C. A. 3d) z42 Fed. 97.
It is to be noted in the above cases that the distinction betlween agents' liability
and that of stockholders was not always before the court's mind, as the defend-
ants were often related to the corporation in both capacities. The language of
the decisions therefore demands careful reading before conclusions are drawn.
It is dubious, e. g., whether Mand eville v. Courtright can fairly be cited at all on
the liability of stockholders as such.
'Merrck v. Van Santvoord (i866) 34 N. Y. 2o8; Second Natl. Bk. v. Hall
(x878) 35 0. St. 158; Boyington v. Van Etten (x896) 6z Ark. 63, 35 S. W. 622;
and see Natl. Bk. v. Spot Cash Coal Co. (igir) 98 Ark. 597, 6o5, 136 S. W. 953,
956; and Tribble v. Hallert (igio) x43 Mo. App. 524, x27 S. W. 61&
" See Bateman v. Service (i88i) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 386, 389, cited GsOErNEs
(z917) 26 YAlE LAw JouRNAr, 481, 484, where the problem is discussed from the
standpoint of conflict of laws; Merrick v. Van Santvoord (z866) 34 N. Y. 208,
215.
i Nor, indeed, of most cases, unfortunately. For an excellent theoretical treat-
ment of the disconcerting fact that corporations do not break out over the map
in blotches, like measles, see Merrick v. Van Santvoord, supra. After all, a
corporation is at bottom only an association of persons having a particular mode
of doing business, decked about with fictions; on this see articles on the individ-
ual liability of stockholders by Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld, 9 Co.. L. Rnv.
285; 9 ibid. 492; io ibid. 283 ; xo ibid. 5o.
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complying, should be deemed a penalty-like statutory fines"4 -laid by
the policy of the state on attempting corporate business without
authority.' Or, where policy forbids business without compliance, the
agent who knowingly breaks over the law may properly be held by
those who relied on his misrepresentation:' that the corporation
would be available, should suit be necessary. That seems the crux
of the agent's fault; only in that can damage consist from misrepre-
sentation of "authority," whether indemnity be sought in an action
for deceit or in one for breach of warranty. But it is clear that no such
theory of agency would suffice to hold the officers and directors where
the corporation itself is in fact subject to suit;16 and the principal case
states that it is so subject
The court avoids the difficulty by treating officers and directors as
partners, as some states treat the stockholders: a body doing business
without authority to be a corporation. Between agents actively man-
aging the concern, to whose direct fault non-compliance can be traced,
and stockholders relying on such agents there is a difference, one none
can help but feel. A distinction in individual liability based on that
difference is sound.' 7 Whether any court take the final step is a matter
of pure policy. But it is to be regretted that in going this far Illinois
thought it good to base its decision on cases embodying the dubious
theory of an agent's "common law liability as principal" where he
contracts without authority, 8 and on that ghost of a ghost, a corpora-
tion's extraterritorial non-existence.
K. N. L.
14 Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co. (1913) 156 Ky. 628, z6x S. W. 570.
"a Citizens" Natl. Bk. v. Bucheit (xg16 Ala.) 71 So. 82. The de facto corpora-
tion analogy is sometimes applied to estop a defendant who has dealt with the
corporation to deny its authority; Second Nati.. Bk. v. Hall, supra. There is,
however, a valid. distinction in that the non-complying foreign company having
taken no bona fide step to bring itself within the law, lacks the buttressing of
public policy. Power to incur only duties or liabilities without corresponding
advantages is rare in our law, but is here and there to be found. That is the
nature of a non-complying corporation's power, under the disabling mentioned
in the text. Somewhat akin is the power of a discharged bankrupt to come
under a duty, by a mere promise, to pay any debt from which his bankruptcy
discharged hini; or, indeed, the power of a person, by a gratuitous sealed instru-
ment, to impose a legal duty upon himself.
"Cf. Mechem, Agency, 2d ed. § 1395.
See (917) 12 Ix L Rnv. 2o7. Of course this argument fails as to agents
of insurance companies, where the qualification rules are directed to the com-
pany's solvency; which, consequently, the agent is held to guarantee. Morton v.
Hart Bros., supra; and see Vertrees v. Head (i9io) 138 Ky. 83, 91, 127 S. W.
523, 526. But cf. Jones v. Horn (x9o4) 1o4 Mo. App. 7o5, 78 S. W. 638.
" See Mandeville v. Courtright, supra, ioo; Second Natl. Bk. v. Hall, supra, 166.
"Lasher v. Stimson (1892) 145 Pa. St 30, 23 AtI. 552, quoted and affirmed
Raff v. Isman (i9r2) 235 Pa. St. 347, 84 At. 352.
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JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF CLAIMS OF
NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANTS
People whose business interests extend to several states,-and there
are daily more of these as society increases in complexity,-need to
know how far the law will protect their interests in their absence and
how great is the liability that their interests may be destroyed or
injured in judicial proceedings unknown to them. It seems therefore,
that something of certainty and uniformity is as much to be desired
in this field of law as in any other.- That there is, however, nothing
even approaching uniformity and certainty will appear as the cases
are discussed.
The following are the facts o the case of National Council of
Knights and Ladies of Security v. Scheiber (1917) 163 N. W. 781,
recently decided in Minnesota. The plaintiff, a fraternal insurance
society, brought an action in equity to cancel an insurance policy which
it had issued on the life of Mrs. Anna Scheiber, the original defendant'
Before the trial Mrs. Scheiber died and, upon motion of the plaintiff,
the court substituted as defendants the two beneficiariesg one of whom
was a resident of California and had been served in that state only.
The latter entered his appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the
court.' Upon a ruling against him, he appealed to the Supreme Court,
which decided that jurisdiction had not been acquired and reversed
the order below.
Though, as a preliminary in this case, it be conceded that the statute
which authorized the substitution of new parties intended to cover the
case of non-residents, there remains the question whether a judgment
against the non-residents is due process of law.$ As to a purely
personal action the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff' settles that it is not.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, adopting the view that this action
was purely personal, decided likewise.
As opposed to this view, however, in an action in Tennessee by one
beneficiary against the insurance company and another beneficiary
(a non-resident not served in Tennessee) to extinguish the alleged
'The very general knowledge by the laity of the fairly uniform rule that real
estate may be sold for taxes ,without any personal service on the owner has
probably been of considerable advantage to tax collectors and property owners
alike
, The court acted under a statute which provided for the substitution of the
successor in interest of a deceased party when the cause of action was one which
survived. Minn. Gen. St. 1913 Sec. 7685. The opinion laid it down without
discussion that this statute was intended to cover the case of a non-resident
successor in interest. This interpretation may be questioned.
'The mere filing of a plea in abatement to contest the jurisdiction may, with-
out violation of due process to the pleader, be seized upon by a state court as
ground for assuming jurisdiction of the case to try the merits. Chicago Life
In. Co. v. Cherry (1917) 244 U. S. 25, 37 Sup. Ct. 492.
' (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
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wrongful claims of the latter in the policy of insurance, it was held
by a divided court that sufficient jurisdiction had been obtained to
adjudicate the rights of the parties.5 The majority considered the
action as quasi in ren and hence not within the rule of Pennoyer v.
Neff.7 By way of comparison, it is to be noted that the facts of the
Minnesota case went a step farther but involved much the same prin-
ciples. The suit there was that of the debtor insurance company
itself, instead of that of a creditor, to extinguish the rights of a non-
resident third party. And to this particular type of case, there may
be an instinctive objection, since it would permit a debtor to get rid
of his debt without personal jurisdiction of his creditor.
The close resemblance of the facts in the Minnesota and Tennessee
cases to those concerned in attachment and garnishment invites a com-
parison, even though as to the latter the states are in hopeless conflict
and it is consequently doubtful if many generally accepted principles
can be fished from the whirlpool of confusing decisions.
Taking the simplest case first, let us assume that A of California
owes B of Minnesota $i,ooo and B finds in Minnesota tangible prop-
erty, land or chattels, which belong to A. This property may be
attached, and the Minnesota court has jurisdiction to extinguish A's
rights in the particular physical objects or acres of land which are in
Minnesota,. even though A has not been personally served and actually
knows nothing of the suit. It does not violate the rule of Pennoyer
v. Neff because it is a proceeding quasi in rem and no personal judg-
ment against A is attempted. The situation would not be different if
A had gold coin or bills in a safety deposit box withii the jurisdiction,
for money is attachable;" but it would be different if A had "money
on deposit" in the First National Bank of St. Paul, for in such a case
there would be no specific physical thing to be attached.9 Under the
usual arrangement between bank and depositor, the bank is a debtor,
not a custodian, bailee or trustee of a particular fund.
'Perry v. Young (1916) 133 Tenn. 52, 182 S. W. 577.
'This view seems to have been founded principally on the fact that the policy
itself, a physical thing, was within the jurisdiction of the court. Attachment
cases form an analogy to support the decision from this angle. The reasoning
in this comment, however, seeks rather to pursue the analogy of garnishment
cases, jurisdiction over the debtor being the essential feature.
The two dissenting judges regarded this as a personal action and consequently
reached the same result as that in our Minnesota case.
'Despite a curious technical rule in early English cases, that money could
not be sold, hence could not be attached. Cf. Knight v. Criddle (18o7 K. B.)
9 East 48 with Turner v. Fendall (i8or U. S.) i Cranch 117, 133.
' This difference is dearly brought out in a case which involved both attach-
mint and garnishment proceedings to reach "moneyon deposit." National Bk.
of the Republic v. Young (I9o5) 125 Ill. App. 139. For general consideration of
proceedings in rem and in personam see Professor Cook, iS Co. L. R. io6-4i;
also 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 760-766.
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For such cases a broader kind of attachment has been provided by
statute, namely, garnishment proceedings. Whereas in the attach-
ment case above assumed, the result of the suit would be to extinguish
the rights of A in or concerning a particular physical tangible mass
or object, for example, a parcel of land or a carload of wheat, in the
garnishment case, the result is to extinguish the rights of A against
a particular person, the debtor Bank. And, dismissing temporarily the
individual idiosyncrasies of the several states,10 that is what has .been
held: A cannot collect of the bank the amount garnished by B. 1
It is not much of a step from these facts to those of the Tennessee
case previously mentioned. Whereas a garnishment is a proceeding in
a court having jurisdiction of a debtor to extinguish his absent creditor's
rights, the suit in Tennessee was a proceeding in a court having juris-
diction of a contingent debtor, the insurance company, to extinguish the
rights of an absent contingent creditor, the beneficiary. Although there
would seem to be no difference in principle, there is this actual distinc-
tion between the cases-the garnishment case is expressly provided for
by statute; the other is not. But in an appeal before the United States
Supreme Court, which involved at once the two kinds of suits here
considered, the decision attempted a distinction in principle, not alto-
gether clear, and did not rely upon a garnishment statute. It held
that California need not recognize the decision of a Pennsylvania
1*Many of the differences arise out of the theory that garnishment reaches
a thing, the debt, and that this debt must therefore have a situs. The situs is
then fixed at one of several places: (i) the dbmicile of the debtor, in which
case it follows that he may not be garnished on a trip to another state;- (2) the
domicile of the creditor, in which case as pointed gut by the court in Lancashire
Ins. Co. v. Corbetts (1897) 165 11. 592, 597-598, 46 N. E. 631, 632, there could
be no such thing as a foreign garnishment; (3) the designated place for pay-
ment of the debt if it be also the jurisdiction in which the creditor resides. See
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Nash (i898) x8 Ala. 477, 23 So. 82; Bragg v. Gaynor
(1893) 85 Wis. 468, 55 N. W. 919; American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Hettler (1893)
37 Neb. 849, 56 N. W. 711, Wyeth Hdw. & Mfg. Co. v. Lang & Co. (i895)
127 Mo. 242, 29 S. W. ioio. In Harris v. Balk (i9o5) i98 U. S. 2r5, 25 Sup. Ct.
625, Mr. Justice Peckham holds that the question of situs is immaterial; the
obligation of the garnishee exists wherever he may be found. See also National
Fire In. Co. v. Chambers (1896, Ch.) 53 N. J. Eq. 468, 477, 32 At. 663, 667-678.
'Harris v. Balk, supra, requiring North Carolina to recognize a garnishment
in Maryland which extinguished the rights of a North Carolina creditor .who was
not under the jurisdiction of the Maryland Court Steltzer vt. Chicago, etc.
(1912) 156 Ia. 1, 134 N. W. 573, recognizing a garnishment in Illinois which
extingushed the rights of an Iowa party served by mail only. One practical
objection to the extension of the old attachment rule to debtors by way of
garnishment is that while a person is fairly likely to keep track of his property
through agents, he is neither likely nor able to keep track of his debtors. The
objection is partly, perhaps altogether, met by the rule in Harris v. Balk that the
garnishee must immediately notify his creditor of the suit on .pain of having
to pay twice.
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court extinguishing the rights of a resident of California in an
insurance policy, although the debtor company was before the Penn-
sylvania court.Y2 If this case be followed, the rule of Harris. v. Balk
will not be extended by the United States Supreme Court to other
than garnishment cases. (But see the very recent case of Hartford
Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, which requires the Supreme Court of
Missouri to recognize a Connecticut. decree extinguishing the rights of
a Missouri beneficiary who Was not 'before the Connecticut court.Y3 )
Aside, however, from the statutory differentiation, which, it should be
noted, has not been urged by the cases, is there any reason why such an
extension would fail to be due process of law? Is there any valid
ground, when the analogy of garnishment cases is considered, for
holding the decree in Perry v. Young and that of the lower court in
Minnesota so utterly unreasonable as to be not due process? It is
somewhat difficult to see that there is.
M. S. B.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND STATE COMPENSATION ACTS
The Supreme Court of the United States, by that five to four
division, unfortunately so usual in the determination of important
constitutional questions, has ruled that state workmen's compensa-
tion acts cannot apply to any cases coming within the jurisdiction of
admiralty. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 524-
This decision was given upon the same day that another important
limitation upon the extent of state compensation acts was announced
nNew York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy (1916) 241 U. S. si8, 36 Sup. Ct. 613.
Cf. Kelly v. Norwich Un. Fire Ins. Soc. (i89i) 82 Ia. i37, 47 N. W. 986, refusing
to admit as evidence the record of a suit in a lower court of New York against
the insurance society to extinguish Kelly's rights, he, a resident of Iowa, not
having been served in New York. The New York Court of Appeals adopted the
Iowa view and later reversed the Supreme Court Order which had been dis-
regarded in Iowa. Mahr V, Norwi'ch Un. Fire Ins. Soc. (i8gi) i27 N. Y. 452,
28 N. E. 391. Cf. Stevenson v. Anderson (1814, Ch.) 2 Ves. & B. 407, 411, in
which Lord Eldon held he would protect the plaintiff against the claims of
non-residents who had been personally served outside the jurisdiction and who
refused to appear.
's (i917 U. S. Sup. Ct.) Nov. xgth, October term, No. 252. It appears that in
this case the insurance company was not a debtor but a trustee of a particular
fund. Barber v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. (1916) 269 Mo. 21, 27, 187 S. W. 867.
See (i916) 25 YAm LAw JoURWAL, 324 and Comment to follow in YALEn LAw
Jout AL for January, i918.
'Reversing (915) 215 N. Y. 514, L. R. A. 19x6 A, 4o3, 1o9 N. E. 6oo, Ann.
Cas. z9x6 B, 276, 9 N. C. C. A. 286. On the same day and upon the same
principles the Supreme Court decided Clyde S. S. Co. v. Walker (917) 37 Sup.
Ct 545 (four justices dissenting) reversing (i915) 215 N. Y. 529, 1o9 N. F. 6o4,
Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 87, but refused to take similar action in an Ohio case on the
ground that the point was not raised in the trial court Valley S. S. Co. V.
Wattawa (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. M.
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in a decision 2 elsewhere commented upon.3 The decision in the
Jensen case is of great interest not only in its bearing upon
compensation law, but also because of its importance upon the
entire question of maritime law as well as the intrinsic interest
of the opinions rendered. Mr. Justice McReynolds spoke for
the majority of the court. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting
opinion containing an unusual number of the epigrammatic state-
ments for which he is renowned, while Mr. Justice Pitney, con-
curring substantially with Mr. justice Holmes, gave a dissenting
opinion so full, so complete and so persuasive as seemingly to
exhaust the subject. Mr. Justice Brandeis. and Mr. Justice Clarke
concurred in the dissent.
The New York Workmen's Compensation Commission had
made an award, sustained by the state courts,5 to the widow and
children of one Jensen, who had been killed while in the employ
of the Southern Pacific Company, a common carrier by rail-
road also owning and operating a steamship line between New
York and Galveston, Texas. Jensen operated an electric track
from the steamship across a gangway to a pier in North River,
New York City, and while thus assisting in unloading the cargo
of lumber, sustained the accidental injury causing his death. The
majority of the Supreme Court hold that, the matter being
maritime and within the jurisdiction of admiralty, the state
compensation act conflicts with the grant of admiralty jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts by the United States Constitution and
is to that extent invalid. 6
Article 3, Section 2, of the federal Constitution extends the
judicial power of the United States "to all cases of admiralty
'N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield (I917) 37 Sup. Ct. 546 (Justices
Brandeis and Clarke dissenting), holding that Congress, by enacting the
Federal Employers' Liability Act had excluded state action concerning
injuries sustained during employment by employees of interstate railway
carriers. As the Court in the Winfield case held that Congress had by
this Act covered the field of such injuries, while in the Jensen case it
held that the Act did not apply to injuries sustained upon an ocean going
steamship not a mere adjunct of an interstate railway, the two cases
present the distinction that in the one Congress had acted, while in the
other it had not.
s See 27 YAlE LAw Jou-NAL 135.
'Thus he says "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign
that can be identified." In another place he remarks "I recognize without
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.
'See note i, above.
' The general constitutionality of the New York compensation statute
was upheld in New York Central R. Co. v. White (917) 243 U. S. 188,
37 Sup. Ct 247.
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and maritime jurisdiction." In 1789 Congress enacted that the
district courts of the United States should have "exclusive
original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it.'" This grant has been continued.
8 The majority opinion
holds that the saving clause does not here apply, as the remedy
which the Compensation Act attempts to give was unknown to
the common law. The court recognizes that certain state laws
affecting maritime matters are upheld but attempts to formulate
a test that no such legislation is valid "if it contravenes 
the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uni-
formity of that law in its international and interstate relations."
A state statute exceeding these limitations is invalid even though
Congress has not legislated upon the point covered by the state
statute, just as in certain cases connected with interstate 
com-
merce, silence of Congress is equivalent to a declaration 
that
commerce shall be free. Conflicting state compensation 
acts
applicable to maritime matters would destroy that uniformity
which the constitutional provision was designed to secure. 
And
finally, this form of remedy is not in harmony with. 
the policy
of Congress to encourage investments in ships, manifested 
in the
acts limiting the liability of ship owners to the amount 
of their
investment.9
It would seem that the case might have been decided 
otherwise
under the authority of the saving clause of the Act 
of 1789, the
constitutionality of which seems never to have been doubted. 
The
framers of that act by their reference to the common 
law
' Section 9, Judiciary Act of 1789 (i Stat. at L. 
76, 77, ch. 20, sec. 9).
'Judicial Code, sections 24, 256 (36 Stat. at L. io9i, ii6o, ch. 213;
Comp. Stat, x9i6, sections 991 (i), 1233).
' Comp. Stat, i916, sections 8o2i-8o23, 8o28. In State v. 
Daggett (i975)
87 Wash. 253, 15I Pac. 648, L. I. A. 1916 A 446, the Washington 
Supreme
Court had decided that the Compensation Act of that state 
could not apply
to maritime injuries, as Congress, having legislated 
upon the matter in
the limited liability statutes, had excluded state action. 
Most of the
state decisions, however, were contrary to the ruling of 
the Jensen case.
See the well considered cases of Kennerson v. Thames 
Towboat Co.
(19r5) 89 Conn. 367, 373, L. R. A. 1916 A 436, 94 At. 372; 
Lindstrom v.
Mutual S. S. Co. (1916) 132 Minn. 328, L. R. A. 1916 D 935, 
I56 N. W.
669; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n. (917, 
Cal.) 163
Pac. 799; also the New York decisions, ante note r; also 
Keithley v.
North Pacific S. S. Co. (1916, D. Oreg.) 232 Fed. 255, 259; Stoll v. Pacific
Coast S. S. Co. (ig3, W. D. Wash.) 205 Fed. i6g. Schuede 
v. Zenith




apparently meant simply the system of law enforced in the
ordinary courts as distinguished from the admiralty courts, and
did not mean that restricted, though uncertainly limited, body of
law which excludes both equity and statutory law.10 Moreover,
the Supreme Court seems so to have decided cases which, though
not overruled by this case, are difficult of reconciliation with it,
notably those cases which have applied state statutes creating
a remedy for death by wrongful act-a remedy unknown to
the common law-to maritime cases, both those brought in the
state courts" and those brought in the admiralty courts. 2
But broader grounds than the mere wording of the Act made
it desirable that the state statute should have been sustained.
Mr. Justice Pitney seems clearly right in pointing out that the
framers of the Constitution in the provision concerning admiralty
matters intended merely to establish jurisdiction and not to
prescribe particular codes or systems of law; to enumerate
rather than define the powers granted.V 3 This jurisdiction was
not in terms made exclusive and, as the decisions of the Supreme
Court show, it was not exclusive under the rules of admiralty
law with two exceptions. These exceptions were prize cases
and civil cases brought under the peculiar "in rem" proceedings
of admiralty where a judgment against all parties in interest
is obtained by process against the thing itself to enforce a mari-
time lien, which, unlike a common law lien, does not rest upon
possession of the property. In all other cases the common law
is competent to give a remedy and its jurisdiction is concurrent.
Hence state statutes attempting to give maritime liens enforced
by in rem proceedings are invalid," ' but other state statutes bear-
1 Speaing of the saving clause of this statute, Mr. Justice Holmes, in
The Hamilton (Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore) (I907) 207 U. S.
398, 404, V L. Ed. 264, 28 Sup. Ct in, said: "And as the state courts
in their decisions would follow their own notions about the law and
might change them from time to time, it would be strange if the state
might not make changes by its other mouthpiece, the legislature." See
also American S. B. Co. v. Chase (1872) I6 WalL 522, 21 L. Ed. 369.
"tSherlock v. Ailing (1876) 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. Ed. 819; American S. B.
Co. v. Chase (1872) 16 Wall. 522, 21 L. Ed. 369.
1 The Hamilton (Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore) (x907) 207 U. S.
398, 52 L. Ed. 264, 28 Sup. Ct. 133; La Bourgogne (Deslions v. La Com-
panie Ginirale Transatlantique) (I07) 210 U. S. 95, 52 L. Ed. 973, 28
Sup. Ct 664.
" Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat i, I8g, i94, 6 L. Ed. 23, 68, 69;
M'Culloch v. Maryland (x89) 4 Wheat 316, 407, 4 L. E . 579, 6o.
1 The Moses Taylor (1866) 4 Wall. 411, 18 L. Ed. 397; The Hine v.
Trevor (1866) 4 Wall. 555, x8 L. Ed. 451; The Glide (1896) 167 U. S.
6o6, 42 L. Ed. 296, 17 Sup. Ct. 930. A state statute creating a lien for
materials used in repairing a foreign ship is invalid. The Roanoke (i9gO)
i89 U. S. 185, 47 L.- Ed. 770, 23 Sup. Ct 491. But not for repairs of a
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ing upon maritime matters, including statutes aiding proceedings
in personam by allowing attachments of the interest of owners
in vessels, are upheld.15 Admiralty courts have enforced state
legislation in the absence of similar legislation upon the part of
Congress." All the more then should the state act be enforced
in the state court when the suitor has chosen the state tribunal
rather than the admiralty court for the determination of his
rights.
17
Moreover, there is no body of law forming a complete
admiralty code. Mr. Justice Holmes, by an ingenious and per-
tinent argument, demonstrates that the wholly incomplete mari-
time law is supplemented by common law principles
8 If
maritime law does thus include common law, and common law
with its statutory changes such as the remedy for death by
wrongful act, it is difficult to see how this common law is
excluded from admiralty by the mere conferring of admiralty
jurisdiction by the federal Constitution upon the federal
courts.
The lack of uniformity which the majority feared would result
from an enforcement of state compensation acts in maritime
matters would be at least a difficulty no greater than the like lack
of uniformity in the application of laws to interstate commerce
before Congress partly 9overed the situation by the passage of
the federal Employers' Liability Act. At most the matter is
one for the legislative department to deal with, and it seems
not to be doubted that Congress might act in this case and that
state laws would then be superseded. Yet it is doubtful if an
act in the nature of an admiralty compensation act is desirable.
The state machinery of compensation commissions (which is
vessel in her home port. The Lottawanna (Rodd v. Heartt) (1874) 21
Wall. 558, 22 L. Ed. 6 54; The J. E. Rumbell (1892) 148 U. S. 1, 37 L. Ed.
345, 13 Sup. Ct. 498. See also Workman v. New York (1goo) 179 U. S.
552, 45 L. Ed. 314, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212.
'Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co. (1914) 237 U. S. 303, 59
L. Ed. 966, 35 Sup. C. 596; Knapp S. & Co. v. McCaffrey (1899) x77 U. S.
638, 44 L. Ed. 921, 2o Sup. Ct. 824, citing cases.
s See notes 12 and 14, supra.
' It is clear that different rules may apply accordingly as a case is
brought in the state or in the admiralty court. Compare The Max Morris
(x8go) 137 U. S. I, 34 L Ed. 586, 11 Sup. Ct. and Atlee v. Northwestern
Union Packet Co. (1874) 21 Wall. 389, 395, 396, 22 L Ed. 619, as to the
effect of contributory negligence in admiralty.
"The argument in brief is that as the Supreme Court has permitted a
recovery for a maritime tort upon ;ommon law principles, as in Atlantic
Transport Co. v. Imbrovek (1913) 234 U. S. 52, 58 L. Ed. 12o8, 51 L. R. A.
(N. S.) z157, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, and as the judges without legislation could
not engraft the common upon the maritime law, therefore fhe maritime
law actually includes in part the common law.
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necessary in view of the many purely local contracts of em-
ployment) ought not to be duplicated by federal machinery
occupying much the same field. Moreover, as the risk resulting
from the liability imposed by various state compensation acts
may be transferred without difficulty to an insurance company,
the practical hindrance to commerce would be small. Then, while
a uniform act is desirable in some fields of law, such as bank-
ruptcy, it is questionable whether compensation to dependents
of injured employees-the real object of compensation acts-
ought to be uniform in all parts of the country, no matter how
the cost of living may vary. Local legislatures and tribunals
are perhaps better fitted to determine the amount of the
compensation.1 9
The limited liability acts furnish no obstacle. They are, of
course, paramount in both state and federal courts and would
operate to place a maximum upon the amount allowable in cer-
tain cases, though only the worst forms of marine disaster ordi-
narily make an appeal to the benefits of the statutes of any
aid to the ship owner. But this limitation of liability has been
applied to claims for death damages based upon state statutes,
2 0
and may just as easily be applied to claims for compensation.
The practical results of the decision are unfortunate. The
earlier cases a~re apparently not to be considered as overruled,
but even if they were the situation would hardly be cleared.
In either event it would be impossible to tell just what was
included in the maritime law. The only test would be the nebu-
lous one set forth by the majority in this case. How certain a
test that is may be imagined when we consider that here five
justices thought the limitations were exceeded, while four
justices thought the objections not well taken. The test hithkerto
applied certainly was more explicit. Then, too, it may be
doubted whether freedom of commerce will be aided by the
lack of a compensation act in admiralty, since modern experience
tends to show the value and the necessity of compensation acts.
To induce labor to turn to the sea, Congress will probably have
to create some compensation remedy applicable to admiralty
and thus perhaps uselessly duplicate state compensation organiza-
tions, thereby obtaining in maritime matters a uniformity of
remedy which does not take into consideration the variations
of local conditions. Hence, a policy which refuses state assistance
in control of maritime affairs before Congress has shown that
See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in New York Central
R. Co. v. Winfield (1917) 37 Sup. Ct 546.
"See cases in note 12, above.
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assistance undesirable may not be the most desirable policy under
all circumstances. 21  C.E.C.
THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CASES
To Lord Fry, specific performance without "mutuality" was
inconceivable.1 The supposed principle proves, however, on
careful analysis to have so many exceptions as to be valueless
as a generalization.2 Indeed when all the exceptions to Lord
Fry's broad statement are considered, the true doctrine of
want of mutuality as a defense to specific performance narrows
down to this: Equity will not grant the plaintiff specific per-
formance of a bilateral contract if, after the defendant's forced
performance, the plaintiff's own obligation will rmain unper-
formed and is of such a nature that, at the time for its fulfillment,
equity would, on grounds independent of mutuality, refuse specific
performance of it,-the one possible limitation to this rule being
that equity might give the plaintiff specific performance if the
defendant's assumed common law remedy for damages would
be fully adequate.8 But some jurisdictions, following the lead
of the federal Supreme Court, have carried the supposed broad
doctrine of mutuality to the extreme extent of applying it to
cases where there is no want of mutuality of- remedy as such, but
only a. want of mutuality 'in the substantive rights and powers
of the parties.4 Thus it has been held that covenants in leases
" Since the above was written, it has been brought to the writer's atten-
tion that Congress, by an act approved October 6, 1917, has amended the
Act of 1789, cited in notes 7 and 8 supra, by adding to the saving clause
the words: "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the work-
men's compensation law of any state." See 244 Fed. 420 (General and
Permanent Acts of Congress). Does not this amendment lead to an
interesting dilemma? If the Act of x789 is constitutional-and it has
always been so considered, and was so considered by the majority in the
Jensen case-it wpuld seem beyond question that the amendment is
also constitutional. Yet the majority in the Jensen case hold that state
compensation acts interfere with the grant of admiralty jurisdiction con-
tained in the United States Constitution. Hence the amendment must be
unconstitutional. Cf. Comment by Professor Wright, 6 CAr- L. REv. 72,
n. i8. The writer of this interesting comment states that the holding of
the majority in the Jensen case that the saving clause of the act did not
apply was merely a dictum. It is difficult to see how the majority in
reaching their conclusion could have avoided a direct decision either that
the statute was unconstitutional or that it did not apply.
'Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d ed.) 225.
'See 36 Cyc. 621..
' Wakeham v. Barker (1887) 82 Cal. 46, 22 Pac. 1131 (exemplifying the
true rule); cf. Jones v. Newhall (1874) iu5 Mass. 244 (inferentially
supporting the suggested limitation).
'Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley (1869, U. S.) io Wall 339.
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of oil or mineral lands would not be specifically enforced against
the lessor when the lessee had the power to terminate his tenancy
without notice or on short notice.5 A recent decision in Indiana
is to this effect. Advance Oil Co. zr Hunt (1917, Ind.) i6 N. E.
34o. Such an application of the doctrine of mutuality is unfor-
tunate. The lessor enters into the lease because he -expects cer-
tain advantages from making it and is willing that the lessee
should protect himself against possible losses by the option to
terminate. It is not unfair to the lessor to hold him to his
bargain. The refusal to do so is not only unjust to the lessee
but also, in some jurisdictions, injurious to the development of
the mineral wealth of the community. Such refusal in. one case6
resulted in the immediate enactment of a statute to remedy the
evil.7 Other states have, without the aid of a statute, repudiated
this application of the doctrine of mutuality.a The federal
Supreme Court ifself has, in the reasoning of a late case, virtually
repudiated its earlier doctrine.9 The remedy sought in that
case, as in the principal case, was an injunction against inter-
ference with the plaintiff's possession by parties claiming under
a subsequent'lease. The court distinguishes such a suit from a
bill for the specific performance of an executory contract, and
considers the desired injunctive relief as simply the giving of
adequate protection, to the plaintiff's vested leasehold interest.
In- this view, the inapplicability of the supposed doctrine of
mutuality is even more apparent. It is unfortunate that in the
principal case the Indiana court followed the authority of its
own earlier cases and the Rutland Marble Co. case,10 entirely
overlooking the later case of Guffey v. Smith,"1  A study of
that case would perhaps have led to a reExamination of the
soundness of the doctrine of mutuality and to a more mature
consideration of the justness of the plaintiff's claim. It is
interesting to note that as the law now stands in Indiana, Illinois
and such other states as still cling to the old formula of mutuality,
a plaintiff lessee under a lease which gives an option to terminate,
will be denied equitable relief in the state courts, but may secure
it if he can bring his suit in the federal courts.
C. I.
'Rust v. Conrad (i88x) 47 Mich. 449, I N. W. 265; Watford Oil $
Gas Co. v. Shipman (19o8) 233 DL 9, 84 N. E. 53.
"Rust v. Conrad, supra.
'See Grummett v. Gingrass (1889) 77 Mich. 369, 43 N. W. 999.
'Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie (i902) 202 Pa. St. 210, 5I Alt. 973;
Gregory Co. v. Shapiro (19z4) x25 Minn. 8r, 145 N. W. 791; Thurber v.
Meves (1897) 119 Cal. 35, 50 Pac. io63.
See Guffey v. Smith (i914) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. S26.
'A Supra, note 4.
"Supra, note g.
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TORT LIABILITY FOR DEPRIVING THE PLAINTIFF, THROUGH FALSE
REPRESENTATIONS, OF AN EXPECTED INHERITANCE.
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut
suggests an interesting question on which there is little direct
authority. In an action for damages, the complaint alleged in
substance that the defendants, with intent to deprive the plaintiff
of any share in his father's estate, made false representations
to the father, since deceased, in regard to the plaintiff's sanity,
and thereby obtained from the father transfers of certain prop-
erty in which the plaintiff would otherwise have shared by
inheritance. A demurrer was sustained on the ground that the
plaintiff had no legal interest in the property transferred and so
suffered no legal wrong. Hall v. Hall (1917) 91 Conn. 514.
The only authorities cited by the court in support of the decision
were cases holding that the law of fraudulent conveyances pro-
tects only creditors and those to whom the grantor owed a duty.
1
But neither the plaintiff's lack of legal interest in the property
nor the authority of the cases cited would seem to be conclusive.
There are cases, of course, where liability results from a clear
infraction of the plaintiff's legal right, regardless of the moral
innocence of the defendant, as in trespass to real estate; and
there would seem to be cases also where the defendant's conduct
is so completely privileged that no degree of improper motive
or moral guilt on his part can impose a civil liability ;2 but the
law is coming more and more to recognize an intermediate class
in which both right and privilege are purely relative, and liability
may depend either on the motives of the defendant's action, or
on the character of the means employed. Thus'liability has been
imposed where the defendant established a rival shop or business
solely for the purpose of ruining the plaintiff's business ;3 where
false but not defamatory statements or implications were em-
ployed with intent to injure the plaintiff ;' and even where truth
was spoken with intent to injure." In. the ordinary case of
fraudulent conveyance, the wrong, if any, whicl vitiates the
'Ullrich v. Ullrich (1897) 68 Conn. 580, 37 At. 393; Harris v. Spe~tcer
(1898) 71 Conn. 233, 41 Atl. 773. See, in accord, Tyler v. Tyler (1888)
126 Ill. 525,21 N. E. 6x6; 12 R. C. L. 49o.
'See James Barr Ames, How far an Act may be a Tort because of the
Wrongful Motive of the Actor (19o5) i8 HAav. L. REv. 411. See also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894) 8 HARv. L.
REv. I.
'Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. (I911) 152 Ia. 618, x32 N. W. 371; Tuttle
V. Buck (1909) I07 Minn. 145, Iu9 N. W. 946.
'Morasse v. Brochu (i89o) 15I Mass. 567, 25 N. E. 74; Davis v. New
England Ry. Pub. Co. (i9o9) 203 Mass. 470, 89 N. E. 565; Ratcliffe v.
Evans [189z] 2 Q. B. 524.
'Huskie v. Griffin (igog) 75 N. H. 345,74 A& 595.
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transfer, is committed by the grantor, and in the absence of debt,
contract or similar obligation, the transfer by a grantor of his
own property may well be regarded as a case of absolute
privilege; but it by no means follows that third persons; having
no similar privilege, can lawfully interfere to the prejudice of
another. Improper motives or fraudulent means might well
make such conduct actionable.
To the objection that no legal right of the plaintiff was
violated, which was apparently regarded as decisive in the
principal case, and in a similar case in New York,8 it might be
answered that a mere expectation of benefit has often been pro-
tected against wilful and unjustifiable interference.1 Perhaps
the most familiar example is found in strike cases where no
contract of employment is violated.' The Connecticut court very
recently made liability in such a case depend on motive.' Thus
the analogies of the law would seem to support the view that
an action might lie for depriving the plaintiff, either fraudulently,
or wilfully and without justification, of an expected inheritance;
and there is a dictum in a well-considered Massachusetts case
presenting. similar facts which strongly supports this view."0
But if damages are to be allowed for the loss of an expected
benefit, it should at least appear as reasonably certain that the
expected benefit would have been received if the defendant had
not interfered, and this is where the real difficulty in such cases
is found.11 Accordingly in the Massachusetts case above referred
to, where the defendant was charged with fraudulently pre-
" Hutchins v. Hutchins (1845, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 7 Hill 1O4.
'See cases above cited and Keble V. Hickeringill (18og) Ii East, 574;
Kiernan v. Metropolitan Const. Co. (x898) "i7o Mass. 378, 49 N. E. 648;
Hutton v. Watters (915) i32 Tenn. 527, 179 S. W. 134, L. R. A. 1916 B,
1238.
sBooth v. Burgess (19o6) 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 AtI. 226; Wilson 7). Hey
(i9o8) 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928.
'Coh$ & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', etc., Union (1917, Conn.)
iioi Aft. 659.
"'Lewis v. Corbin (i9o7) I95 Mass. 520, 8I N. E. 248. See also dictum
in Murphy v. Mitchell (1917, N. D. N. Y.) 245 Fed. 219. Cf. Dulin v.
Bailey (1916) 172 N. C. 6o8, 9o S. E. 689, where action was allowed for
mutilating a will containing a legacy to the plaintiff, and so preventing
probate of the will.
"' The opinion in the principal case looks momentarily in this direction,
by emphasizing the fact that the grantor is not alleged to have been
mentally incapable of an intelligent disposition of his property at the time
of the transfers in question; but this is made a reason for the conclusion
that'he had a legal right to convey, rather than for the inference that even
without the defendant's interference he might not in fact have left the
property to descend to the plaintiff.
"2Lewis v. Corbin, supra.
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venting the proper execution by a third person of a codicil in
the plaintiff's favor, a demurrer was sustained because it was
not clearly stated that the testator's intention of benefiting
the plaintiff, as manifested in the invalid codicil, continued
unchanged until the death of the testator. The principal case
might well have been decided on a similar ground. It appeared
that the plaintiff's father, subsequent to the transfers complained
of, had executed a will of his remaining property in favor of
the defendants, and the will had been probated; and though
there were also charges of fraud in inducing the execution of
this will, and of lack of testamentary capacity, the court properly
held, on that aspect of the case, that the probate decree was not
subject to collateral attack, and so long as it stood, was con-
clusive on the issue of testamentary capacity, and all other issues
involved in the validity of the will. It would seem to follow that,
until the plaintiff could set aside the will, he could not show that
he had lost anything by the previous transfers. It is to be
regretted, however, that the court disposed of the case so readily
on what seems a very imperfect analogy to the ordinary cases
of fraudulent conveyances, and thus missed the opportunity to
throw new and much needed light on the still unsettled question
of the basis and limits of tort liability, as well as on the specific
problem on which authority is so very meagre.13
MV. B.
ENCROACHMENTS BELOW GROUND OR WELL ABOVE THE SURFACE:
IS EJECTMENT AN ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY?
In a recent case it was held that ejectment would lie where
the bay window and eaves of a house projected over an adjoin-
ing owner's land. The court based its decision, rendered over
the defendant's objection that the plaintiff should have sought
her remedy in equity, partly on the ground that the defendant
had refused to make any compromise with the plaintiff outside
of court, and partly on the fact that the projections could be
cut off without materially affecting the rest of the building.
McDivitt v. Bronson (1917, Neb.) 163 N. W. 761.
Whether or not ejectment will lie in cases similar to that just
stated is a question to which the courts have given contradictory
I It would seem that the case might naturally have been considered as a
suit for defamation with allegation of special damage, but this view of
it was not discussed by the court, and even if it were so considered, since
damage in such a case is the gist of the action, the question would still
remain whether the damage complained of was of such a character and so
related to the alleged wrongful conduct that the law would allow it to be
recovered.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
answers.1 Those jurisdictions which allow the action to be
brought for overhanging projections do so on the theory that
the owner of land may be ousted from his possession by struc-
tures built above or below the surface, as well as by those built
upon the surface. Opposed to this view are those authorities
which regard the encroachment as only the invasion of a right,
and not an ouster.2 As to what constitutes ouster as contrasted
with mere trespass, in the kind of encroachments under dis-
cussion, the conflicting decisions do not allow the formulation of
a rule. Seemingly the one essential on which all are agreed, is a
permanency, or probable permanency, in the encroaching struc-
ture. That the owner should be interfered with in the actual, in
distinction from the theoretical, enjoyment of his land is appar-
ently not always necessary.3 In regard to foundation walls which
encroach below the ground, no part of the superstructure extend-
ing over the dividing line, the courts are no more agreed than
in the case of encroaching eaves and cornices.'
From the standpoint of practical application to actual con-
ditions, the disadvantage of ejectment as a remedy in cases of
encroachment lies not so much in the difficulty of determining
what constitutes ouster, as in the obstacles which may confront
the sheriff in the execution of the judgment. The order to
remove encroaching overhead wires may be carried out easily
enough when the wires in question are merely telephone wires ;5
but the sheriff well might hesitate to remove wires carrying a
powerful current of electricity. The removal of encroaching
'Ejectment was allowed in the following cases: Murphy v. Bolger Bros.
(I888) 70 Vt 723, i5 AtI. 365; Johnson v. Minnesota Tribune Co. (1904)
91 Minn. 476, 98 N. W. 321. Ejectment was not allowed in Vrooman v.
Jackson (1876, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 6 Hun 326; Huber v. Stark (9o5) 124
Wis. 359.102 N. W. 12.
2 See Norwalk Heating & Lighting Co. v. VerMan (1903) 75 Conn. 662,
r8 AtL i68. If the encroachment continues long enough, the owner of the
projecting structure acquires an easement. Grace M. E. Church v. Dobbins
(893) 153 Pa. St. 294, 25 Atl. 1120. But he gets no claim to the land
below the projection, and can not prevent the owner from building thereon.
Keats v. Hugo (874) ia5 Mass. 216.
'But under certain circumstances the fact that the plaintiff is not pre-
vented from taking possession of the surface of the land may be an
additional reason for refusing ejectment Harrington v. Port Huron
(i89i) 86 Mich. 46, 48 N. W. 641.
'Ejectment will lie: McCourt v. Eckstein (1867) 22 Wis. 153; Wachstein
vt. Christopher (i9o7) 128 Ga. 229, 57 S. E. 511. It will not lie: Rahn v.
Milwaukee R. R. Co. (1899) io3 Wis. 467, 79 N. W. 747; especially where
the plaintiff has later erected a building up to the true line and has used
as a foundation the projecting portion of the defendant's wall. Zander v.
Brewing Co. (1897) 95 Wis. 162, 70 N. W. 164.
'Butler v. Telephone Co. (i9o6) 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716.
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underground waterpipes would probably be a task of no con-
siderable magnitude provided the pipes were empty; but if
water under pressure were being forced through them, the diffi-
culties of the sheriff who should attempt to remove them would
be almost insurmountable. Nor should the sheriff be expected
to carry out an order of removal when by so doing he would
be forced to enter upon the defendant's land or injure his build-
ing, and thus render himself liable to an action of trespass."
It has been recognized that even in such a seemingly simple
operation as cutting off projecting cornices, the sheriff ought
to' be protected against the danger of taking more than his
"pound of flesh."8 And on what basis shall the sheriff execute
a writ commanding the removal of two feet of an encroaching
foundation wall, when it is found that the remaining portion of
the wall would not be sufficient to suppoirt the building?
9
This inability of the sheriff to remove the encroachment
doubtless has led many of the courts to grant mandatory injunc-
tions in this class of cases; it is not only more equitable, but
easier, oftentimes, to put the burden oi removing the encroach-
ment directly upon him who caused it to be erected.
10 Conse-
quently mandatory injunctions have been granted ordering the
defendant to remove the encroaching eaves or foundation wall
1
Or in the alternative he has been allowed to accept a compromise
which has been offered by the plaintiff and found equitable by
the court12 One jurisdiction at least has enforced the injunction
'In the case of sewer pipes a mandatory injunction has been refused on
the ground that the remedy by ejectment is adequate. Kiernan v. Mayor of
Jersey City (igog) 76 N. J. Eq. xz4, 74 AtI. 139. But see Harrington v.
Port Huron, supra.
"'It cannot be removed by execution, because of the damage to the
remainder of defendant's property. By taking down the wall it would
impose a risk of damage upon the sheriff which he is not bound to incur
in an execution.' Blake v. McCarthy (igo9, Trial T.) z15 N. Y. Supp.
1014.
£ Norton v. Elwert (8.95) 29 Oreg. 583, 4! Pac. 926.
* Curtiss Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co. (igog) 2o3 Mass. 488, 89 N. F.
534.
"Baron z. Korn (i891) 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804.
' Injunction to remove projecting eaves or cornice. Wilmarth v. Wood-
cock (1885) 58 Mich. 482, 25 N. W. 475; Pentony v. Penn. R. R. (19li)
231 Pa. St 464, So AtL io52; Norwalk Heating and Lighting Co. v.
Vernam, supra. Injunction to remove encroaching foundation wall.
Mulrein v. Weishecker (1899 N. Y.) 37 App. Div. S45, 56 N. Y. Supp. 240;
Curtiss Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Co. supra. In one case an injunction was
granted as to the eaves of a building, the defendant having deliberately
extended them over the line; but it was refused as to the foundation,
where the encroachment was unintentional and very slight. Harrington
v. McCarthy (1897) x69 Mass. 492, 48 N. . 27&
'Blake v. McCarthy, supra.
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strictly even in a case of innocent mistake on the defendant's
part, and where the uncompromising attitude of the plaintiff
has made the work of removal unnecessarily hard.1 3
It has been a question whether, if ejectment will lie, and the
plaintiff elects that remedy, he is later entitled to equitable
relief if he has been successful in his action at law. Since equity
will not interfere where the plaintiff has an adequate legal
remedy, will the remedy afforded by an action of ejectment be
regarded as adequate?" Must the successful plaintiff rest con-
tent in the knowledge that the sheriff is under a duty to remove
an encroachment which he is practically powerless to remove?
On principle, equitable relief should be granted when it turns out
that what, in theory, is an adequate legal remedy, is, in fact,
no remedy at all. But hitherto it has not been possible to support
this thesis with authority, so far as ejectment cases are con-
cerned. On the contrary it has been held that one who has
recovered in ejectment might not later come into equity to
compel the defendant to remove the encroachment. 5 A recent
New Jersey decision takes the opposite and more just view. In
this case, after the plaintiff in an action of ejectment had pro-
cured a judgment and had had execution issued thereon, the
sheriff refused to remove the encroaching wall, built wholly
below the surface of the ground, because the large size of the
foundation stones made such removal impossible without tres-
passing on the defendant's land and injuring his building, which
did not extend over the line above the surface. A mandatory
injunction was issued to compel the defendant to remove the
obstruction. Hirschberg v. Flusser (1917, N. J.) IOI Atl. 191.
This seems the correct solution of the problem. G. E. W.
"Pile v. Pedrick (1895) i67 Pa. St. 96, 31 At. 646, 647. This seems
too severe on the defendant; but it has not been overruled. See Baugh
v. Bergdoll (9,o) 227 Pa. St. 420, 76 At. 2o7.
"Even where a portion of the building, as well as the foundation wall,
overlapped the line, it has been held that the proper remedy was at law
in an action of ejectment, and not in equity. Beck v. Ashland Cigar Co.
(igI1) 146 Wis. 324, 13o N. W. 464. And see Cromwell v. Hughes (o6)
i44 Mich. 3, io7 N. W. 323.
'This was under a code which provided that the action should not be
Split. Hahl v. Sugo (igoi) 169 N. Y. i09, 62 N. E. i35- To the same
effect is Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co. (i9o2) 86 Minn. 365, 9o N. W. 767.
